EIP-8361
The tampered issuance proposal has sparked quite heavy debate in the ethereum community, both on the forum and twitter.
Both in percent per year, by total ETH staked — from nothing staked to the entire supply.
At 41.7M staked today: 2.58% yield, 0.89% dilution.
Table view
| ETH staked | Issuance / yr | Staker yield | Non-staker dilution |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0M | 0 ETH | — | 0.00% |
| 20M | 743,820 ETH | 3.72% | 0.62% |
| 40M | 1,051,920 ETH | 2.63% | 0.87% |
| 60M | 1,288,334 ETH | 2.15% | 1.07% |
| 80M | 1,487,640 ETH | 1.86% | 1.23% |
| 100M | 1,663,232 ETH | 1.66% | 1.38% |
| 120M | 1,821,979 ETH | 1.52% | 1.51% |
| 120.5M | 1,825,771 ETH | 1.52% | 1.52% |
Consensus-layer issuance only, at full participation: the protocol pays out 64 × √(total staked) per epoch, so issuance rises with the square root of the stake while a non-staker’s balance stays flat. Yield is that issuance divided by the stake, so it excludes tips and MEV, which are transfers from users rather than new supply. Fee burn, which offsets supply growth for stakers and non-stakers alike, is excluded too. Supply assumed 120.5M ETH. Dilution is issuance ÷ supply, the same base as the yield, so the gap between the curves is exactly the transfer from non-stakers to stakers: yield ÷ dilution = supply ÷ staked. At 100% staked that is 1 — the yield is entirely dilution and a staker’s real return is zero.
A burn of b = (D ÷ D_sat)^1.5 cancels issuance entirely at 60.25M staked. Drag the phase-in to see the elevated base reward factor decay away.
At activation the factor is 128, twice today's, so yields start near today's level.
At 41.7M staked today, the burn is 58%, leaving 2.19% yield and 0.76% dilution, against 2.58% and 0.89% today.
Table view (at the phase-in above)
| ETH staked | Burn | Net issuance / yr | Staker yield | Non-staker dilution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0M | 0% | 0 ETH | — | 0.00% |
| 20M | 19% | 1,203,123 ETH | 6.02% | 1.00% |
| 40M | 54% | 965,775 ETH | 2.41% | 0.80% |
| 60M | 99% | 16,021 ETH | 0.03% | 0.01% |
| 80M | 100% | 0 ETH | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 100M | 100% | 0 ETH | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 120M | 100% | 0 ETH | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 120.5M | 100% | 0 ETH | 0.00% | 0.00% |
Same assumptions as above — consensus-layer issuance at full participation, no tips or MEV, no fee burn — with the draft’s deduction applied on top: every assigned duty is charged b = (D ÷ D_sat)^1.5 of its idealised reward and that ETH is destroyed, so net issuance is the current curve times (1 − b). With D_sat = 60.25M, issuance peaks near 23.91M staked (20% of the supply) and falls to zero at 50%, past which the clamp holds it there. Both curves reach zero together, so beyond saturation staking earns no issuance and holders are not diluted by it. The phase-in only scales the whole schedule; it does not change that shape.
Solo Staker
My timeline on twitter is full of alleged solo stakers in support, and solo stakers who claim they will quit staking when the proposal passes. My understanding of the issue is that, solo stakers are not the most rational people in economic terms. If you leverage 32ETH on AAVE, you can achive a yield of ~16.4% (wstETH 95% LT ~2.15 APR, WETH 1.4% APR), while as a solo staker the theoretical maximum right now is 2.6% not considering cost of running, maintenance and potential penalties. If you stake 32+ ETH today as a pure solo staker, you cannot use your stake as collateral, so you cannot leverage.
What gets multiplied is the spread, not the yield. Looping to an LTV of k leaves you at 1/(1 - k) leverage, so the return on equity is 2.15% + (1/(1 - k) - 1) * (2.15% - 1.4%): 20x and 16.4% if you borrow all the way up to the 95% threshold.